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Chinese Human Rights Guidance on
Minerals Sourcing: Building Soft Power 
Karin BUHMANN 
Abstract: China’s economic engagement in Africa has been subject 
to criticism on social and environmental fronts. This analysis exam-
ines two sets of guidelines launched by the government-related China 
Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals and Chemicals. Aiming 
to promote responsible investment in the minerals sector and due 
diligence to ensure socially responsible sourcing of minerals with a 
particular focus on human rights, the guidelines refer to international 
human rights standards and are designed to be consistent with guid-
ance issued by the OECD. The article discusses the Chinese guide-
lines as responses to the international critique and concludes they are 
elements of China’s soft-power efforts meant to enhance the coun-
try’s reputation as a responsible actor on the global stage. The analy-
sis comes from the perspective of China’s deployment of state-driven 
corporate social responsibility (CSR), its complex relationship with 
international human rights, and its engagement with the international 
business and human rights (BHR) regime. 
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Introduction 
China’s recent engagement in Africa has been subject to critique for 
focusing on economic value while largely disregarding social and 
environmental impacts (Giese 2014). This also applies to the sourcing 
of minerals – particularly the so-called “conflict minerals” from the 
Great Lakes Region, where minerals and extraction are often con-
trolled by warlords responsible for human rights atrocities. Address-
ing the occurrence of such problems within other states does not 
easily conform to the foreign policy line that China has adhered to for 
decades in response to criticisms of its human rights violations that 
have come from other states or from United Nations human rights 
bodies: in China’s view, human rights are internal matters that should 
be exempt from international scrutiny (Le 2012). Implicitly, if that 
point applies to China, it applies to other states as well. Yet China’s 
Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals and Chemicals 
(CCCMC), a state-controlled industry association, issued two sets of 
guidelines, respectively in 2014 and 2015, setting specific directives 
for overseas operations of Chinese mining-sector firms. CCCMC’s 
Guidelines for Social Responsibility in Outbound Mining Investment (CCCMC 
2014) were followed in December 2015 by the Chinese Due Diligence 
Guidelines for Responsible Mineral Supply Chains (CCCMC 2015), which 
elaborate the 2014 guidelines as to avoiding dealing with conflict-re-
lated materials. 
CCCMC’s guidelines explicitly refer to the UN Guiding Prin-
ciples on Business and Human Rights, adopted by the United Na-
tions Human Rights Council in 2011. The UNGPs refer to the UN 
International Bill of Human Rights’ and the International Labour 
Organization’s (ILO) core labour standards as the minimum baseline 
of human rights that companies should respect (UN 2011: para 12). It 
is intriguing that guidance for Chinese companies operating overseas 
incorporates reference to international law instruments that explicitly 
cover some of the labour rights and other human rights that China 
does not support nationally. The point is no less striking when we 
recognise that many of the companies addressed by the guidelines are 
state-owned enterprises (PWC 2012), and that the guidance instru-
ments are issued by an organisation that is closely associated with a 
governmental ministry, the Ministry of Commerce and Trade 
(MOFCOM).  
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The international policy implications of the human rights refer-
ences become even more intriguing when considering that the 
CCCMC guidelines are aligned with guidance issued by the Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The 
OECD is an international organisation comprising approximately 35 
industrialised countries in the Global North with “Western” political 
values and a capitalist market orientation. OECD states traditionally 
support civil and political human rights, while China traditionally 
emphasises economic and social rights. China is not a member of the 
OECD, yet CCCMC’s 2015 guidelines are explicitly aligned with the 
OECD’s guidance document for responsible minerals sourcing 
(OECD 2013), which itself is influenced by the United Nations Guid-
ing Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs), adopted in 
2011 and described further below (see also Buhmann 2015). China 
has not adopted the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI), a public–private initiative advocating transparency of com-
pany payments to host-country governments and promoting govern-
ance in resource-rich countries. China has expressed support for the 
EITI and UN resolutions promoting the EITI, and some Chinese 
companies also report according to the EITI (Paris 2010; EITI 2016). 
While international corporate social responsibility (CSR) standards 
exist in the minerals sector (Tan-Mullins 2015), national standards 
remain rare. CCCMC’s guidelines are both unusual, in that they are 
national standards for responsible minerals-sector conduct overseas, 
and advanced, in terms of their explicit application of terminology 
deriving from the UNGPs. This begs the question of what China 
aims to achieve politically by issuing minerals-sector guidelines that 
interact explicitly with international human rights standards.  
This article1 frames the topic as an example of soft power. It ar-
gues that by integrating human rights standards in minerals-sector 
guidance in response to critique from international society and civil 
society organisations, China expands its own soft-power basis by 
displaying itself as a responsible actor on the international stage. With 
soft power defined as when one country gets other countries to want 
what it wants (Nye 1990), enhancing the country’s acceptance in the 

1 This manuscript has benefitted from useful comments and suggestions from 
the journal editors, two anonymous reviewers, and comments from participants 
at a workshop on Chinese Soft Power (Aalborg University, Denmark) in Janu-
ary 2016 where an early version was presented. 
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international community (through demonstrating an intent to change 
in response to international critique) in turn enhances China’s ability 
to influence other parts of the international policy agenda.  
Moreover, the legitimacy of a state to exercise persuasion as a 
form of soft power (Wilson 2008) may increase as it enhances its 
international standing in a complex field, such as minerals sourced 
from conflict-prone areas suffering from weak governance. Such 
increased standing might support China’s national goal of building 
the country into a socialist cultural superpower, announced in the 
Final Communiqué at the 17th Central Committee of China’s Com-
munist Party (CCP) in 2011, and aligns with President Xi Jinping’s 
message in 2014 that China should increase its soft power, deliver a 
good Chinese narrative, and better communicate China’s messages to 
the world in what Shambaugh (2015) refers to a “soft-power push.” 
Such narratives have internal and external elements (Roselle, 
Miskimmon, and O’Loughlin 2014).  
This article first provides context for China’s African footprint, 
for the emergent international business and human rights (BHR) 
regime, and for China’s application of CSR for policy purposes, a 
strategy that has been deployed nationally for some time. Next, 
CCCMC’s two sets of guidelines are introduced in more detail, fol-
lowed by a discussion of their alignment with the BHR regime against 
the backdrop of China’s political deployment of CSR. The final sec-
tion concludes that the Chinese guidelines for minerals sourcing are a 
response to international critique that may pave the way for enhanced 
soft power by presenting China as a responsible actor on the global 
stage. The analysis is based on the legal method of document analysis 
in a context of public and private engagement to govern the social 
impact of economic activity through transnational normative regimes. 
The two sets of guidelines have legal relevance, as they offer norma-
tive directives for Chinese companies and are based on international 
law.  
Due to space limitations, the article focuses only on the political 
aspects of China’s reputation, and not on whether the guidelines 
enhance the business opportunities of the Chinese minerals sector in 
a global market concerned with the social impacts of business. Due to 
their recency, information on application by firms is not available. 
Future information on this may add nuance to observations in this 
article. 
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Context
China’s Social and Environmental Impact in Africa
China’s engagement in Africa as an economic power has brought 
critique from many sources. China’s sourcing of minerals has been 
noted to fuel or risk prolonging conflicts that have long been a con-
cern among international circles, civil society groups, and responsible 
investors and consumers (Kurlantzick 2007). Great concern has been 
expressed over China’s investment in and sourcing of so-called “con-
flict minerals”: gold and three specific minerals (tin, tungsten, and 
titanium) (“G3T”). G3T extraction is associated with gross human 
rights violations and exploitation of labour in certain weak states, 
particularly in the African Great Lakes Region, which is a large source 
of these minerals (UN 2010). It has been argued that resources are 
extracted for the benefit of China’s economic growth to the detri-
ment of the African continent’s own sustainable human development 
and economic growth (Webster 2013; Tan-Mullins 2015). China has 
been accused of supporting socially adverse practices in natural re-
source exploitation through its local labour practices and lack of envir-
onmental concern (Godwin 2011; Mol 2011).  
The Business and Human Rights Regime 
Recent decades have witnessed widespread concern over the adverse 
social impact of business activities as a result of the twentieth cen-
tury’s expansion of economic rights of transnational business that are 
unconstrained by corresponding societal duties (Ruggie 2004, 2014). 
Several codes of conduct issued by private organisations and sectoral 
CSR initiatives had already emerged by the time the UN launched a 
process in 2005 to clarify businesses’ responsibilities vis-à-vis human 
rights and to elucidate states’ duties to prevent human rights abuses 
caused by businesses. The process resulted in the “Protect, Respect 
and Remedy” Framework for Business and Human Rights (herein-
after: UN Framework) (UN 2008), which was launched as a policy 
proposal but was highly normative and subsequently “operational-
ised” through the UNGPs (UN 2011), an international soft-law in-
strument adopted by the UN Human Rights Council in 2011. The 
UNGPs do not establish new human rights, but referring to the In-
ternational Bill of Human Rights and to the ILO’s core labour stand-
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ards they elaborate the implications of existing human rights with a 
view to avoiding business-related abuse. Broad agreement within the 
UN supported by civil society and business underscored the signifi-
cance of this new BHR regime.  
Whereas CSR is seen to involve business action (traditionally be-
yond compliance with law, even if governments are increasingly seek-
ing to shape such CSR action (Gond, Kang, and Moon 2011; Buh-
mann 2016)), the BHR regime builds on a combination of state and 
business action. It comprises states’ obligations to protect against 
human rights violations, and businesses’ responsibilities to avoid in-
fringing on human rights. Because the risk of gross human rights 
abuses is heightened in conflict-affected areas, home states of com-
panies operating in such areas should help ensure – for example, 
through legislation and guidance – that business enterprises operating 
in those contexts are not involved in such abuses (UNGP No. 7). 
Territorial constraints limit the extraterritorial regulatory powers 
of nation-states. To overcome this, the UNGPs encourage states to 
apply “smart” mixtures of regulation that combine hard and soft law, 
economic incentives, and other modalities. In conflict-affected areas 
and elsewhere, this should be done by the home state recommending 
or requiring human rights due diligence. The introduction of human 
rights due diligence (a process to identify, prevent, and mitigate the 
human rights–related risks of their own activities and those of busi-
ness relationships) is one of the most groundbreaking elements of the 
UN-endorsed business and human rights regime. This is a process to 
be undertaken by economic actors in order to identify and manage 
social risks caused by a firm – for example, the prolongation of con-
flicts by sourcing goods that help fund the conflict-mongers. 
The UNGPs have influenced several national and international 
public, private, and hybrid regulatory initiatives. The two Chinese 
guidelines considered here are among recent national examples of this 
influence, which makes them interesting in their own right. From the 
perspective of the current focus, that point is enhanced by the fact 
that the Chinese guidelines are influenced by the OECD uptake of 
the UNGPs. The OECD’s Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
are among the most comprehensive normative standard influenced by 
the UNGPs (Buhmann 2015). Dating from 1976, a 2011 revision 
(OECD 2011) adopted the UNGPs’ due diligence approach but ex-
panded its application beyond human rights to most CSR issues in-
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cluding labour and the environment. The OECD followed up by 
developing detailed due diligence guidance for selected sectors, in-
cluding G3T minerals (OECD 2013). 
OECD member states have a default obligation to recommend 
observation of the OECD’s guidelines to firms registered or operat-
ing in those states, and non-OECD states may accede to them as 
well. Several emerging economies have done so, but China has not. 
Yet, CCCMC’s guidelines are explicitly aligned with both the OECD’s 
guidelines and the UNGPs, as well as detailed OECD guidance on 
due diligence for minerals supply chains. In the Chinese context, this 
alignment has been presented as a CSR issue.  
China’s Political Engagement with CSR 
China’s approach to CSR differs from that of Europe and the United 
States. In China, CSR serves a purpose of addressing environmental, 
labour, or food safety issues that are policy concerns of the govern-
ment and whose delivery is significant for the legitimacy of the gov-
ernment (Tan-Mullins and Hofman 2015). Internally, CSR is applied 
to encourage businesses of many sizes to do their part to help deliver 
on public policy objectives, such as providing social security or ad-
vancing the respect for labour conditions in accordance with Chinese 
law. We shall revert to the external parallel below.  
Whereas in Europe the role of the state in relation to CSR had 
remained somewhat in the background until recently, with CSR hav-
ing mainly been viewed as business self-regulation (Matten and Moon 
2008; Fairbrass 2011; Buhmann 2011), in China the state has taken a 
much more active role in CSR promotion (Harper Ho 2013; Tan-
Mullins and Hofman 2015; Gond, Kang, and Moon 2011). Article 5 
of the 2005 Company Law notes that “companies bear social respon-
sibilities.” China’s government drew on CSR as part of the strategy to 
implement former president Hu Jintao’s policy of establishing a 
“harmonious society.” This included addressing labour conditions 
and environmental issues that caused unrest. Accordingly, social and 
environmental challenges, such as unemployment, social welfare, and 
use of natural resources, have informed the Chinese conception of 
CSR (Lou and Guo 2009; Blair, Williams, and Lin 2008) and the gov-
ernment’s deployment of a mixture of governance strategies to pro-
mote sustainable growth in a context of economic reform and global-
isation (Lin 2012; Enderle 2010). While within China, food safety, 
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consumer preferences, and economic performance are important 
CSR concerns (Dellios, Yang, and Yilmaz 2009; Zu and Song 2009), 
observers outside China have long paid attention to human rights and 
labour standards in both China and other countries affected by Chi-
nese economic operations overseas, including in the minerals sector 
(Chan, Ip, and Lam 2009; Tan-Mullins 2015).  
As part of its CSR policies, China supported the process through 
which the UNGPs elaborate the UN Framework’s guidance into 
operational steps for states and companies. This occurred even 
though the UNGPs refer to the International Bill of Rights and the 
ILO’s core labour standards as the minimum baseline for responsible 
business conduct. Of the two human rights treaties that are part of 
the International Bill of Rights alongside the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, China has ratified only the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (in 2001). China took the polit-
ical step of signing the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1998 
but has yet to proceed to the legally binding ratification (UN 2017). 
Under Chinese law, a national labour union is recognised, but not 
free trade unions. Trade union freedom is recognised by the Interna-
tional Bill of Rights and also forms part of the ILO’s core labour 
standards. At the political level, former president Jiang Zemin af-
firmed that China embraces the UN’s human rights work and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Permanent Mission 1998). 
China’s 2016–2020 National Human Rights Action Plan suggests that 
the formal policy’s embrace of human rights is broad. Scholars sug-
gest that China’s policies on human rights evolve with the country’s 
economic growth (Liu 2014).  
Within China, several initiatives connect CSR and human rights, 
even if the point is rarely made explicit. China has engaged actively 
with the UN Global Compact, an initiative that offers CSR guidance 
for firms based on ten principles, of which six are based on the In-
ternational Declaration of Human Rights and ILO fundamental con-
ventions. Those principles commit firms to respecting human rights 
and international labour rights, including trade union freedom. China 
hosted the first international UN Global Compact summit (in Shang-
hai in 2005), has encouraged firms to join the Compact, and is one of 
a small number of governments (among which the majority are West-
ern European) to sponsor the Global Compact Office in New York 
City. In view of China’s regular rejection of international critique of 
  Chinese Human Rights Guidance on Minerals Sourcing 143 

its national human rights records (Le 2012) and its official commit-
ment to a single trade union, China’s support for the Global Compact 
is noteworthy. Together, these initiatives indicate an embrace of hu-
man rights for specific, business-related practical purposes, which is 
interesting in light of China’s more hesitant position on the interna-
tional policy stage. The reason may be that the business field offers a 
less political take on human rights, which allows the government to 
experiment with endorsing human rights and then assessing the im-
plications.  
China’s labour laws set higher requirements for the minimum 
employment age and weekly working hours than those specified in 
the international labour standards of the ILO. But the letter of the 
law is often not observed in practice in labour and environmental 
areas (Harper Ho and Huang 2014; Van Rooij and Lo 2010). CSR 
offers a modality to advance implementation of labour standards 
whose non-observance challenges both the perception of the gov-
ernment’s effectiveness and the reputation of Chinese business. For 
example, CSC9000T, a CSR management tool developed by the na-
tional textile council, aims to increase Chinese business managers’ 
understanding of labour law requirements (International Trade Cen-
tre 2011; CSC9000 Quarterly 2011).  
China’s official engagement with CSR suggests that CSR serves a 
political purpose in areas that are politically sensitive or subject to 
internal or external critique of non-compliance with legal standards, 
whether in regard to national or international law. Adopting the lan-
guage of CSR allows organisations involved to address economic 
actors directly, and for governments to activate expectations of busi-
ness or economic benefits as drivers for change, in line with a reflex-
ive law strategy (Orts 1995; Buhmann 2011). This incorporates CSR 
into proactive instrumental regulatory approaches that involve busi-
nesses in delivering on governmental policy objectives and social 
expectations, thereby allowing the government to benefit from an 
improved public perception of legitimacy.  
Providing national CSR guidance instruments offers the gov-
ernment a way to shape business actions within a context of econom-
ic growth and trade. CSR offers ways to reduce risks to the percep-
tion of the state’s legitimacy resulting from concerns over businesses’ 
impacts on social conditions. While this is not necessarily different 
from the way that CSR is coming to be applied by governments else-
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where (Buhmann 2013), the due diligence guidance issued for exter-
nal minerals sourcing goes beyond the national focus and helps craft 
China’s international image and soft power, as shown below. 
China’s Mining Investment and Due Diligence 
Guidelines
In 2014 CCCMC issued the Guidelines for Social Responsibility in Out-
bound Mining Investment (CCCMC 2014, hereinafter “Mining Invest-
ment Guidelines”). These were followed in December 2015 by the 
Chinese Due Diligence Guidelines for Responsible Mineral Supply Chains 
(CCCMC 2015, hereinafter “Due Diligence Guidelines”). The latter 
provide detailed guidance for implementation of a single clause in the 
2014 Mining Investment Guidelines. Relating back to the UNGPs’ 
human rights due diligence, that clause covers risk-based supply-chain 
due diligence in order to prevent engagement with materials that may 
have funded or fuelled human rights-related conflict. 
The Mining Investment Guidelines 
A subordinate unit of MOFCOM, CCCMC represents a membership 
of approximately 6,000 companies, encompassing the majority of 
Chinese mining companies investing abroad and trading mineral, 
metal, and hydrocarbon products (Emerging Markets Network for 
Sustainability n.y.). 
The Mining Investment Guidelines were developed with the par-
ticipation of the Chinese government and the Chinese mining indus-
try (Emerging Markets Network for Sustainability n.y.) as well as 
Global Witness (China-Africa-Real-Story 2014), an NGO that is 
highly critical of business activity that causes human rights abuses. By 
international standards, the Mining Investment Guidelines are de-
tailed and up-to-date in terms of international soft- and hard-law 
norms on responsible business conduct, offering guidance for firms 
in the minerals, mining, and chemicals sectors. The guidelines are 
advanced compared to many international general or sectoral CSR 
guidelines in their specification of issues to be addressed and norma-
tive guidance based on detailed internationally agreed-upon standards, 
in particular the UNGPs. 
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The Mining Investment Guidelines are promoted by CCCMC to 
Chinese companies and investors as guidance for the mining sector 
on establishing social-responsibility management systems, disclosing 
CSR information, and integrating social and environmental factors 
into investment decisions and operations abroad. They are structured 
along issue-areas that feature in CSR debates with a focus on human 
rights and supply-chain management, such as human rights in general, 
labour practices, and occupational health and safety. The opening 
clause in the guidelines’ chapter on human rights (2.4.1) makes explicit 
reference to the UNGPs, and notes that companies should observe 
the UNGPs during the entire life cycle of the given mining project. 
The wording of the text in this section is closely aligned with that of 
the UNGPs (specifically, UNGPs no. 15 and 22). For example, the 
guidelines note that companies should develop a human rights due 
diligence process to identify, prevent, mitigate, and remedy adverse 
impacts on human rights, and that they should cooperate with the 
local community to effectively remedy those affected by adverse hu-
man rights impacts by way of a legitimate process. The human rights 
chapter provides that companies should conduct risk-based supply-
chain due diligence in order to prevent engagement with materials 
that may have funded or fuelled conflict (esp. clause 2.4.6). An elabor-
ate footnote refers to G3T minerals originating in the African Great 
Lakes Region as particularly “conflict-prone” minerals and explains 
the types of conflicts and human rights conflict risks associated with 
these minerals. That approach is in line with the UNGPs, but argu-
ably diverges from China’s argument that a country’s national human 
rights issues are internal matters. Specific steps in the due diligence 
process are set out, and here, too, the language draws on the UNGPs.  
The Due Diligence Guidelines 
Published in late 2015, the Due Diligence Guidelines for Responsible 
Mineral Supply Chains were developed by CCCMC in close coopera-
tion with the OECD. A Memorandum of Understanding between the 
OECD and China highlighted agreement on the need for guidance 
for social risk–based due diligence for economic actors with potential 
relations to conflict-prone minerals. Developing the Due Diligence 
Guidelines was set out in an official “Vision and Action Plan” be-
tween China and the OECD for 2015–2016, which frames China’s 
emergent collaboration with the OECD (OECD n.y.).  
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The explicitly stated objective of the Due Diligence Guidelines is 
to provide operational details to the Mineral Investment Guidelines 
for conducting risk-based supply-chain due diligence in order to pre-
vent engagement with materials that may have funded or fuelled con-
flict. Against that backdrop, the particular objective of the Due Dili-
gence Guidelines is  
to provide guidance and support to companies which are extract-
ing and/or using mineral resources and their related products and 
are engaged at any point in the supply chain of minerals to identi-
fy, prevent, and mitigate the risks of directly or indirectly contrib-
uting to conflict, serious human rights abuse, and risks of serious 
misconduct. (CCCMC 2015: 3) 
This language and especially the “identify, prevent, and mitigate” 
wording is closely aligned with the UNGPs as well as the OECD’s 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the OECD’s Due Dili-
gence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from 
Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas (OECD 2013). 
The Due Diligence Guidelines’ introduction notes the role of 
G3T minerals in fuelling ongoing conflict. The UNGPs are described 
as a key initiative for the international community to address the ad-
verse link between business and human rights (CCCMC 2015: 6). A 
final paragraph in the introduction is fully devoted to human rights 
and the importance of “responsible companies” applying a due dili-
gence process. Despite China not being an OECD member, the 
guidelines describe the OECD’s Due Diligence Guidance for Re-
sponsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and 
High-Risk Areas as the “recognised international framework” for 
supply-chain due diligence in the sector.  
Thus, the 2015 guidelines offer specific guidance for due dili-
gence aligned with the OECD’s due diligence guidance and the 
UNGPs’ language. They enhance the human rights significance of the 
Mining Investment Guidelines by providing elaboration. Phrasing 
severe human rights violations in a context of guidance implicitly 
recognises that Chinese companies may risk contributing to such 
violations. 
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Discussion 
For some time, China has engaged actively with CSR in areas that are 
politically sensitive or subject to internal or external political critique 
of inadequate compliance with legal standards, whether according to 
national or international law. The Mining Investment Guidelines and 
Due Diligence Guidelines take this engagement from the internal to 
the external, building on the approach to CSR that China has taken 
on the national stage for some years. Working for change through 
economic activity and calling for business engagement to contribute 
to fulfilling public policy needs shifts the focus from the govern-
ment’s role to an active role by companies (of which many are state-
owned). Through the two CCCMC guidelines, China applies a similar 
approach on the transnational stage.  
The two sets of guidelines developed by CCCMC for the min-
erals sector do not fit into the soft-power mould of persuasive power 
associated with intangible power resources such as culture, ideology, 
and institutions (Nye 2009). They make no claim of hegemony of 
Chinese-based values or practices, nor do they seek to promote Chi-
nese values beyond China. By contrast, they adopt normative direc-
tives developed by the OECD and align their aims with those of the 
OECD’s guidelines and specific due diligence guidance. The OECD’s 
guidelines aim to encourage extraterritorial respect for and even pro-
motion of public policy objectives such as protecting human rights, 
improving industrial relations/labour, and engaging in anti-corruption 
efforts, which are close to the defined value basis of the European 
Union, the United States and other OECD member states.  
Yet, CCCMC’s guidelines may be understood as part of the 
cocktail of the Chinese exercise of soft power precisely for this rea-
son – by not referring to the conventional Chinese approach to hu-
man rights as internal issues within a state, and by instead responding 
to international concerns. The guidelines respond to international 
concerns over atrocities associated with conflict minerals and present 
China as willing to join the UN and OECD in addressing the atro-
cities. They display China’s support in the twenty-first century for 
important developments in international human rights law through 
the BHR regime as institutionalised through the UNGPs and their 
uptake by the OECD. By applying international standards on human 
rights and responsible economic activity in conflict-prone areas, the 
two sets of guidelines form part of the Chinese efforts to promote 
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the country as a responsible actor on the international stage. By refer-
ring to G3T and the Great Lakes Region conflicts, the guidelines 
implicitly acknowledge the critique that has been raised of Chinese 
economic practices related to the minerals, the region, and the con-
flicts. 
When CCCMC, with its basis within MOFCOM and corres-
pondingly close relationship to China’s government, designs norma-
tive standards for responsible economic activity in the G3T field on 
the basis of internationally agreed-upon standards such as the 
UNGPs and OECD guidelines, that activity may help or be intended 
to help deflect the international critique. The Chinese guidelines have 
been carefully crafted to apply CSR language that allows for com-
municating standards of conduct to Chinese actors in a transnational 
setting within the CSR discourse with which they are already familiar 
inside China. In a market affected by CSR expectations, the guide-
lines’ alignment with OECD standards obviously helps level the eco-
nomic opportunities of China and Chinese SOEs and investors in the 
minerals sector vis-à-vis competitors applying OECD standards (or 
other national standards, such as the conflict-mineral disclosure re-
quirement introduced by the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act in the United States). Less explicit but just 
as important, on the policy side it allows China to be seen as taking 
an active role in reducing the causes of conflicts and, therefore, to be 
seen as responsible actor on the global stage.  
Crafting a positive image of China and the Chinese minerals sec-
tor, the CCCMC guidelines serve to fulfil the aim described by Presi-
dent Xi to deliver a good Chinese narrative. By applying broadly 
agreed-upon international standards in a field where China has been 
argued to contribute to the prolongation of conflicts and human 
rights violations, the guidelines pave the way for communicating Chi-
na’s messages to the world in a positive light. Eventually, this may 
also contribute to the national goal of building the country into a 
socialist cultural superpower.  
Conclusion  
This article has argued that CCCMC’s guidelines and their explicit 
engagement with the UNGPs and OECD guidance can be under-
stood as China responding to international critiques in an effort to 
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achieve goals through attraction rather than coercion (Nye 2004) and 
to change China’s image on the international stage and among Afri-
can partners. To the international community, the CCCMC guidelines 
and their explicit references to the business and human rights regime 
offer a message that China takes international concerns over socially 
irresponsible conduct in relation to sourcing minerals seriously, in 
particular with regard to G3T. However, in addition to responding to 
international criticism by showing an appreciation of it, China may be 
paving its way to more influence by being recognised as a responsible 
global actor in the field of conflict minerals, which is in the interface 
between international trade and policy. This duality can be under-
stood as a smart exercise of soft power: on the one hand aligning 
with what is expected of a responsible actor on the international stage 
in order to enhance the country’s reputation, on the other hand build-
ing a soft-power basis for interaction and political leverage on that 
stage. 
Moderating its general human rights policies in a narrowly de-
fined international area of business and limiting their application to 
regions outside China as per the guidelines, China gains the dual ad-
vantages of being better placed to convince other countries to act in 
accordance with its priorities in other international policy areas and 
being seen as an international leader (for example, in innovating in-
ternational finance, as in the case of the Asian Infrastructure Devel-
opment Bank). 
Both referencing international standards intended to reduce ad-
verse social impacts of transnational economic activities and explicitly 
engaging with due diligence guidance developed by the OECD on the 
basis of the normative framework of the BHR regime adopted by the 
UN through the UNGPs helps China attain respect for itself as a 
responsible actor in the minerals sector. Through the 2014 Mining 
Investment Guidelines, China sent a message that implicitly acknow-
ledged the international critique of the adverse social and environ-
mental impacts resulting from its transnational economic activity 
lacking particular conditions or principles. CCCMC’s 2015 Due Dili-
gence Guidelines signal China’s desire to be respected and, indeed, its 
commitment to be respectable as an economic power mindful of its 
impact on conflict minerals and on the African states that have been 
marred by decades of conflicts fuelled by irresponsible minerals 
sourcing. The CCCMC guidelines play a role in China’s soft-power 
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approach by enhancing trust in China, thus enabling higher Chinese 
engagement in a complex issue-area and region and potentially be-
yond, both in terms of issues and regions. In this manner, the guide-
lines function as components of the external elements of China’s 
soft-power push, as part of a public relations offensive to promote 
the reputation of China and Chinese businesses operating overseas. 
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